Chapter 7
The Korean War
"Politics, as a practice, whatever its
professions, has always been the systematic organization of
hatreds."-Henry Adams
The roots of the Korean War are deeply embedded in history. While
few regions are less suited to warfare than is the mountainous,
river-slashed Korean peninsula, few have known more conflict. For
centuries, Korea’s three powerful neighbors — China, Japan, and the
Soviet Union — vied for its control. By 1910, Japan had
established a supremacy it maintained until its defeat in World War
II.
Seven days before the Japanese surrender that ended World War II,
the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Soviet troops entered Korea.
By agreement, the Soviet Union accepted the surrender of all
Japanese forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel of latitude,
while the United States accepted the surrender of Japanese units
south of the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union quickly sealed off the
38th-parallel border. It soon set up an interim civil government for
the nine million Koreans of the north, which contained most of
Korea’s industry. The government was run by Soviet-trained communist
officials.
The United States maintained a military government in the south.
The 21 million Koreans of the largely agricultural region were not
satisfied with it. A U.S./Soviet commission, established to make
plans for the reunification of Korea under a free government, made
no progress. In 1947, the United States took the problem before the
United Nations, which voted that free elections under its
supervision should be held throughout Korea in 1948 to choose a
single government. The Soviet Union refused to permit the United
Nations election commission to enter the north. Elections were thus
held only in the south, where a National Assembly and a president,
Syngman Rhee, were chosen. The new democracy was named the Republic
of Korea.
In the north, the Soviet Union proclaimed a Communist
dictatorship called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North
Korea). Pyongyang was named its capital. Late in 1948, Soviet forces
began to withdraw from North Korea, leaving behind an entrenched
communist regime and a well-trained, well-equipped North Korean
army. U.S. occupation forces left South Korea in 1949. They
left behind a government still “feeling its way,” and an army
ill-trained and ill-equipped compared to that of the north.
Nevertheless, South Korea successfully resisted North Korean
attempts at subversion, communist-supported guerrilla activities,
and border raids by North Korean forces. Frustrated, North Korea
early in 1950 decided upon war to achieve its goal of Korean
unification under Communist rule.
In June 1950, North Korea’s army totaled 135,000 men. North
Korea’s infantry was also supported by approximately 150 Soviet-made
medium tanks, ample artillery, and a small air force. South Korea’s
ground forces included a 45,000-member national police force and an
army of 98,000. South Korea was armed largely with light infantry
weapons supplied by the United States. It had no tanks or combat
aircraft, and its artillery was inferior to that of North Korea. Its
officers and enlisted men generally had less training and experience
than did those of North Korea. After the insurgency showed signs of
failing, the northern government undertook a direct attack, sending
the North Korea People’s Army south across the 38th parallel before
daylight on Sunday, June 25, 1950. The invasion, in a narrow sense,
marked the beginning of a civil war between peoples of a divided
country. In a larger sense, the Cold War between the great power
blocs had erupted in open hostilities.
The Western Bloc, especially the United States, was surprised by
the North Korean decision. Although intelligence information of a
possible June invasion had reached Washington, the reporting
agencies judged an early summer attack unlikely. The North Koreans,
they estimated, had not yet exhausted the possibilities of the
insurgency and would continue that strategy only.
The North Koreans, however, seem to have taken encouragement from
the U.S. policy that left Korea outside the U.S. “defense line” in
Asia and from relatively public discussions of the economies placed
on U.S. armed forces. They evidently accepted these as reasons to
discount American counteraction — or their sponsor, the USSR,
may have made that calculation for them. The Soviets also appear to
have been certain that the United Nations would not intervene, for
in protest against Nationalist China’s membership in the UN Security
Council and against the UN’s refusal to seat Communist China, the
USSR member had boycotted council meetings since January 1950 and
did not return in June to veto any council move against North Korea.
Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Premier, was confident his army, a
modest force of 135,000, was superior to that of South Korea.
Koreans who had served in Chinese and Soviet World War II armies
made up a large part of his force.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) Army had just 95,000 men and was far
less fit. Raised as a constabulary during occupation, it had not in
its later combat training under a U.S. Military Advisor Group
progressed much beyond company-level exercises. The ROK Navy matched
its North Korean counterpart, but the ROK Air Force had only a few
trainers and liaison aircraft. U.S. equipment, war-worn when
furnished to South Korean forces, had deteriorated further, and
supplies on hand could sustain combat operations no longer than
fifteen days. Whereas almost eleven million dollars in materiel
assistance had been allocated to South Korea in fiscal year 1950
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, congressional review of
the allocation so delayed the measure that only a trickle of
supplies had reached the country by June 25, 1950.
The North Koreans quickly crushed South Korean defenses at the
38th parallel. The main North Korean attack force next moved down
the west side of the peninsula toward Seoul, and entered the city on
June 28. The South Koreans withdrew in disorder. The troops driven
out of Seoul were forced to abandon most of their equipment because
the bridges over the Han River at the south edge of the city were
prematurely demolished. The North Koreans halted to regroup after
capturing Seoul, but then soon crossed the Han.
In Washington, where a fourteen-hour time difference made it June
24 when the North Koreans crossed the parallel, had its first report
of the invasion at night. The United States soon requested a meeting
of the UN Security Council. The Council adopted a resolution that
afternoon, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and a
withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.
In independent actions on the night of June 25, President Truman
relayed orders to Army General Douglas MacArthur who was at the Far
East Command headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. Truman ordered the
general to supply ROK forces with ammunition and equipment, evacuate
American dependents from Korea, and survey conditions on the
peninsula to determine how best to assist the republic further. The
president also ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet from its current
location in Philippine and Ryukyu waters to Japan.
The next day, in a broad interpretation of a UN Security Council
request for “every assistance” in supporting the June 25 resolution,
President Truman authorized General MacArthur to use air and naval
strength against North Korean targets below the 38th parallel. The
president also redirected the bulk of the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan
where, by standing between the Chinese Communists on the mainland
and the Nationalists on the island, it could discourage either one
from attacking the other and thus prevent a widening of hostilities.
When it became clear on June 27 that North Korea would ignore the
UN demands, the UN Security Council, again at the urging of the
United States, asked UN members to furnish military assistance to
help South Korea repel the invasion. President Truman immediately
broadened the range of U.S. air and naval operations to include
North Korea, and authorized the use of U.S. Army troops to protect
Pusan, Korea’s major port at the southeastern tip of the peninsula.
Meanwhile, MacArthur had flown to Korea. After witnessing failing
ROK Army efforts in defenses south of the Han River, he recommended
to Washington that a U.S. Army regiment be committed in the Seoul
area at once, and that this force be built up to two divisions.
President Truman’s answer on June 30 authorized MacArthur to use all
forces available to him.
It was the first time since its founding that the United Nations
reacted to aggression with a decision to use armed force. The United
States would accept the largest share of the obligation in Korea
but, still deeply tired of war, would do so reluctantly. President
Truman later described his decision to enter the war as the hardest
of his days in office. But he believed that if South Korea was left
to its own defense and fell, no other small nation would have the
will to resist aggression, and communist leaders would be encouraged
to override nations closer to U.S. shores. The American people,
conditioned by World War II to battle on a grand scale and to
complete victory, would experience a deepening frustration over the
Korean conflict, brought on in the beginning by embarrassing
reversals on the battlefield.
The speed of the ensuing North Korean drive, along with the lack
of preparedness of American forces, compelled MacArthur to disregard
the principle of mass and commit units piecemeal, trading space for
time. At MacArthur’s order, the army moved into a defensive position
astride the main road near Osan, 10 miles below Suwon, by dawn on
July 5. MacArthur later referred to this 540-man force, called Task
Force Smith, as an “arrogant display of strength.” Another kind of
arrogance at Osan was a belief that North Koreans might “...turn
around and go back when they found out who was fighting.”
The next three delaying actions, though fought by larger forces,
had similar results. In each case, North Korean armor or infantry
assaults against the front of the American position were accompanied
by an infantry double envelopment. By July 13, the 24th Division was
forced back on Taejon, 60 miles below Osan, where it initially took
position along the Kum River above the town. Clumps of South Korean
troops by then were strung out west and east of the division to help
delay the North Koreans.
Meanwhile, fifty-three UN members signified support of the
Security Council’s June 27 action, and twenty-nine of these made
specific offers of assistance. Ground, air, and naval forces
eventually sent to assist South Korea would represent twenty UN
members and one non-member nation. The wide response to the
council’s call showed the necessity for a unified command.
Acknowledging the United States as the major contributor, the UN
Security Council on July 7 asked it to form a command into which all
forces would be integrated and to appoint a commander. In the
evolving command structure, President Truman became executive agent
for the UN Security Council. The National Security Council,
Department of State, and Joint Chiefs of Staff participated in
developing the grand concepts of operations in Korea. In the
strictly military channel, the Joint Chiefs issued instructions
through the army member to the unified command in the field,
designated the United Nations Command (UNC) and established under
General MacArthur.
Between July 14 and 18, MacArthur moved the 25th and 1st Cavalry
Divisions to Korea after cannibalizing the 7th Division to
strengthen those two units. By then, the battle for Taejon had
opened. In running enemy roadblocks during the final withdrawal from
town, Major General William F. Dean, the division commander, took a
wrong turn and was captured some days later in the mountains to the
south.
While pushing the 24th Division below Taejon, the main North
Korean force split, one division moving south to the coast, then
turning east along the lower coast line. The remainder of the force
continued southeast beyond Taejon toward Taegu. Southward advances
by the secondary attack forces in the central and eastern sectors
matched the main thrust, all clearly aimed to converge on Pusan.
North Korean supply lines grew long in the advance, and less and
less tenable under heavy UNC air attacks. FEAF, meanwhile, achieved
air superiority, indeed air supremacy, and UNC warships wiped out
North Korean naval opposition and clamped a tight blockade on the
Korean coast. These achievements and the arrival of the 29th
Regimental Combat Team from Okinawa on July 26 notwithstanding,
American and South Korean troops steadily gave way. American
casualties rose above six thousand and South Korean losses reached
seventy thousand. By the beginning of August, General Walker’s
forces held only a small portion of southeastern Korea.
Alarmed by the rapid loss of ground, Walker ordered a stand along
a 140-mile line arching from the Korea Strait to the Sea of Japan
west and north of Pusan. His U.S. divisions occupied the western
arc, basing their position on the Naktong River. South Korean
forces, reorganized by American military advisers into two corps
headquarters and five divisions, defended the northern segment. A
long line and few troops kept positions thin in this “Pusan
Perimeter.” But replacements and additional units now entering or on
the way to Korea would help relieve the problem, and fair interior
lines of communications radiating from Pusan allowed Walker to move
troops and supplies with facility.
Raising brigades to division status and conscripting large
numbers of recruits, many from overrun regions of South Korea, the
North Koreans over the next month and a half committed thirteen
infantry divisions and an armored division against Walker’s
perimeter. But the additional strength failed to compensate for the
loss of some fifty-eight thousand trained men and much armor that
was suffered in the advance to the Naktong. In meeting the connected
defenses of the perimeter the enemy commanders didn't recognize the
value of massing forces for decisive penetration at one point. They
dissipated their strength instead in piecemeal attacks at various
points along the Eighth Army line.
Close air support played a large role in the defense of the
perimeter. But the Eighth Army’s defense really hinged on a
shuttling of scarce reserves to block a gap, reinforce a position,
or counterattack wherever the threat appeared greatest at a given
moment. Timing was the key, and General Walker proved a master of
it. His brilliant response prevented serious enemy penetrations and
inflicted telling losses that steadily drew off North Korean
offensive power. His own strength meanwhile was on the rise. By
mid-September, he had more than five hundred medium tanks.
Replacements continued to arrive, including additional units: the
5th Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii, the 2d Infantry Division and
1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the United States, and a British
infantry brigade from Hong Kong. Thus, as the North Koreans lost
irreplaceable men and equipment, UNC forces acquired an offensive
capability.
Against the gloomy prospect of trading space for time, General
MacArthur, at the entry of U.S. forces into Korea, had perceived
that the deeper the North Koreans drove, the more vulnerable they
would become to an amphibious envelopment. He began work on plans
for such a blow almost at the start of hostilities, favoring
Inch’on, the Yellow Sea port halfway up the west coast, as the
landing site. Just 25 miles east lay Seoul where Korea’s main roads
and rail lines converged. A force landing at Inch’on would have to
move inland only a short distance to cut North Korean supply routes,
and the recapture of the capital city also could have a helpful
psychological impact. Combined with a general northward advance by
the Eighth Army, a landing at Inch’on could produce decisive
results. Enemy troops retiring before the Eighth Army would be cut
off by the amphibious force behind them or be forced to make a slow
and difficult withdrawal through the mountains farther east.
MacArthur formed the headquarters of the X Corps from members of
his own staff. He rebuilt the 7th Division by giving it high
priority on replacements from the United States and by assigning it
eighty-six hundred South Korean recruits. This was part of a larger
program, the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army, in which South
Korean troops were placed among almost all American units. At the
same time, he acquired from the United States the greater part of
the 1st Marine Division, which he planned to fill out with the
Marine brigade currently in the Pusan Perimeter. The X Corps, with
these two divisions, was to make its landing as a separate force,
not as part of the Eighth Army.
MacArthur’s superiors and the Navy judged the Inch’on plan
dangerous. The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated serious
consequences if Inch’on were strongly defended, since MacArthur
would be committing his last major reserves at a time when no more
General Reserve units in the United States were available for
shipment to the Far East. Four National Guard divisions had been
federalized on September 1, but none of these was yet ready for
combat duty; and, while the draft and call-ups of Organized Reserve
Corps members were substantially increasing the size of the Army,
they offered MacArthur no prospect of immediate reinforcement. But
MacArthur was willing to accept the risks.
In light of the uncertainties, MacArthur’s decision was a
remarkable gamble — but if results are what count, his action was
one of exemplary boldness. The X Corps swept into Inch’on on
September 15 against light resistance and, though opposition
stiffened, steadily pushed inland over the next two weeks. One arm
struck south and seized Suwon while the remainder of the corps
cleared Kimpo Airfield, crossed the Han, and fought through Seoul.
MacArthur, with dramatic ceremony, returned the capital city to
President Rhee on September 29.
General Walker, meanwhile, attacked out of the Pusan Perimeter on
September 16. On September 23, after the portent of Almond’s
envelopment and Walker’s frontal attack became clear, the North
Korean forces broke. The 8th Army forged ahead in pursuit, linking
with the X Corps on September 26. About thirty thousand North Korean
troops escaped above the 38th parallel through the eastern
mountains. Several thousand more, bypassed in the pursuit, hid in
the mountains of South Korea to fight as guerrillas. But by the end
of September, the North Korea People’s Army ceased to exist as an
organized force anywhere in the southern republic.
President Truman, to this point, had frequently described the
American-led effort in Korea as a “police action,” a euphemism for
war that produced both criticism and amusement. Set on halting the
aggression, he was determined to limit hostilities to the peninsula
and to avoid taking steps that would prompt Soviet or Chinese
participation. By western estimates, Europe with its highly
developed industrial resources, not Asia, held the high place on the
Communist schedule of expansion; hence, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alliance needed the deterrent strength that
otherwise would be drawn off by a heavier involvement in the Far
East.
On this and other bases, a case could be made for halting
MacArthur’s forces at the 38th parallel. In re-establishing the old
border, the UNC had met the UN call for assistance in repelling the
attack on South Korea. In an early statement, Secretary of State
Acheson had said the United Nations was intervening “...solely for
the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior
to the invasion from the north.” A halt, furthermore, would be
consistent with the U.S. policy of containment.
But there was substantial military reason to carry the war into
North Korea. Failure to destroy the thirty thousand North Korean
troops who had escaped above the parallel and an estimated thirty
thousand more in northern training camps— all told, the
equivalent of six divisions — could leave South Korea in little
better position than before the start of hostilities. Complete
military victory, by all appearances within easy grasp, also would
achieve the long-standing U.S. and UN objective of reunifying Korea.
Against these incentives had to be balanced warnings of sorts
against a UNC entry into North Korea from both Communist China and
the USSR in August and September. But these were counted as attempts
to discourage the UNC, not as genuine threats to enter the war, and
on September 27 President Truman authorized MacArthur to send his
forces north, provided that by the scheduled time there had been no
major Chinese or Soviet entry into North Korea and no announcement
of intended entry.
The outlook for the UNC in the last week of October was
distinctly optimistic, despite further warnings emanating from
Communist China. Convinced by all reports, including one from
MacArthur, that the latest Chinese warnings were more saber-rattling
bluffs, President Truman revised his instructions to MacArthur only
to the extent that if Chinese forces should appear in Korea,
MacArthur should continue his advance if he believed his forces had
a reasonable chance of success.
In hopes of ending operations before the onset of winter,
MacArthur on October 24 ordered his ground commanders to advance to
the northern border as rapidly as possible and with all forces
available. In the United States, a leading newspaper expressed the
prevailing optimism with the editorial comment that “Except for
unexpected developments...we can now be easy in our minds as to the
military outcome.”
UNC forces moved steadily along both coasts, and one interior ROK
regiment in the Eighth Army zone sent reconnaissance troops to the
Yalu at the town of Ch’osan on October 26. But almost everywhere
else, the UNC columns encountered stout resistance and, on October
25, discovered they were being opposed by Chinese. “Unexpected
developments” had occurred.
At first, it appeared that individual Chinese soldiers, possibly
volunteers, had reinforced the North Koreans. By November 6, three
divisions of ten thousand men each were believed to be in the 8th
Army sector and two divisions in the X Corps area. The estimate rose
higher by November 24, but not to a point denying UNC forces a
numerical superiority or to a figure indicating full-scale Chinese
intervention.
Some apprehension over a huge Chinese intervention grew out of
knowledge that a huge Chinese force was assembled in Manchuria. But
General MacArthur felt that the auspicious time for intervention in
force had long passed; the Chinese would hardly enter when North
Korean forces were ineffective instead of earlier, when only a
little help might have enabled the North Koreans to conquer all of
South Korea. He seemed convinced that the United States would
respond with all power available to stage a massive intervention,
which would deter Chinese leaders. In an early November report to
Washington, he acknowledged the possibility of full intervention by
the Chinese but pointed out that “...there are many fundamental
logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come
to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.” His reports by the
last week of the month indicated no change of mind.
Intelligence evaluations from other sources were similar. As of
November 24, the general view in Washington was that “... the
Chinese objective was to obtain UN withdrawal by intimidation and
diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there would
be increasing intervention. Available evidence was not considered
conclusive as to whether the Chinese Communists were committed to a
full-scale of offensive effort.” In the theater, the general belief
was that future Chinese operations would be defensive only, that the
Chinese units in Korea were not strong enough to block a UNC
advance, and that UNC air power could prevent any substantial
Chinese reinforcement from crossing the Yalu. Hence, UNC forces
resumed their offensive. There was in any event, MacArthur said, no
other way to obtain “...an accurate measure of enemy strength....”
In northeastern Korea, the X Corps, now strengthened by the
arrival of the 3d Infantry Division from the United States, resumed
its advance on November 11. In the west, General Walker waited until
the 24th to move the Eighth Army forward from the Ch’ongch’on while
he strengthened his attack force and improved his logistical
support. Both commands made gains. Part of the U.S. 7th Division, in
the X Corps zone, actually reached the Yalu at the town of
Hyesanjin. But during the night of November 25, strong Chinese
attacks hit the Eighth Army’s center and right; on the 27th the
attacks engulfed the leftmost forces of the X Corps at the Changjin
Reservoir; and by the 28th UNC positions began to crumble.
MacArthur now had a measure of Chinese strength. By November 24,
more than 300,000 Chinese combat troops were in Korea. “We face an
entirely new war,” MacArthur notified Washington on November 28. On
the following day, he instructed General Walker to make whatever
withdrawals were necessary to escape being enveloped by Chinese
pushing hard and deep through the 8th Army’s eastern sector, and
ordered the X Corps to pull into a beachhead around the east coast
port of Hungnam, north of Wonsan.
In the 8th Army’s withdrawal from the Ch’ongch’on, a strong
roadblock set below the town of Kunu-ri by Chinese attempting to
envelop Walker’s forces from the east caught and severely punished
the U.S. 2d Division, last away from the river. Thereafter, at each
reported approach of enemy forces, General Walker ordered another
withdrawal before any solid contact could be made. He abandoned
P’yongyang on December 5; by December 15 he was completely out of
contact with the Chinese and back at the 38th parallel, where he
began to develop a coast-to-coast defense line.
In the X Corps’ withdrawal to Hungnam, the center and right-most
units experienced little difficulty. But the 1st Marine Division and
two battalions of the 7th Division retiring from the Changjin
Reservoir encountered Chinese positions overlooking the mountain
road leading to the sea. After General Almond sent Army troops
inland to help open the road, the Marine-Army force completed its
move to the coast on December 11. General MacArthur briefly
visualized the X Corps beachhead at Hungnam as a “geographic threat”
that could deter Chinese to the west from deepening their advance.
He later ordered the X Corps to withdraw by sea and proceed to
Pusan, where it would become part of the 8th Army. Almond started
the evacuation on the December 11, contracting his Hungnam perimeter
as he loaded troops and materiel aboard ships in the harbor. With
little interference from enemy forces, he completed the evacuation
and set sail for Pusan on Christmas Eve.
On the day before, General Walker was killed in a motor vehicle
accident while traveling north from Seoul toward the front.
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway hurriedly flew from Washington
to assume command of the 8th Army. After conferring in Tokyo with
MacArthur, who instructed General Ridgway to hold a position as far
north as possible and maintain the 8th Army intact, the new army
commander reached Korea on the December 26.
Ridgway wanted at least to hold the 8th Army in its position
along the 38th parallel and, if possible, to attack. But his initial
inspection of the front raised serious doubts. The 8th Army, he
learned, was a disheartened command, the result of the hard Chinese
attacks and the successive withdrawals of the past month. He also
discovered much of the defense line to be thin and weak. The Chinese
XIII Army Group meanwhile appeared to be massing in the west for a
push on Seoul, and twelve reconstituted North Korean divisions
seemed to be concentrating for an attack in the central region.
>From all evidence available, the New Year holiday seemed a logical
date on which to expect the enemy’s opening assault.
Holding the current line, Ridgway judged, rested both on the
early commitment of reserves and on restoring the 8th Army’s
confidence. The latter, he believed, depended mainly on improving
leadership throughout the command. To strengthen the line, he
committed the 2d Division to the central sector where positions were
weakest, even though that unit had not fully recovered from losses
in the Kunu-ri roadblock, and pressed General Almond to quicken the
preparation of the X Corps whose forces needed refurbishing before
moving to the front. Realizing that time probably was against him,
he also ordered his western units to organize a bridgehead above
Seoul, one deep enough to protect the Han River bridges, from which
to cover a withdrawal below the city should an enemy offensive
compel a general retirement.
Enemy forces opened attacks on New Year’s Eve, directing their
major effort toward Seoul. When the offensive gained momentum,
Ridgway ordered his western forces back to the Seoul bridgehead and
pulled the rest of the Eighth Army to positions roughly on line to
the east. After strong Chinese units assaulted the bridgehead, he
withdrew to a line 40 miles below Seoul. In the west, the last
troops pulled out of Seoul on January 4, 1951, demolishing the Han
bridges on the way out as Chinese entered the city from the north.
Only light Chinese forces pushed south of the city and enemy
attacks in the west diminished. In central and eastern Korea, North
Korean forces pushed an attack until mid-January. When pressure
finally ended all along the front, reconnaissance patrols ordered
north by Ridgway to maintain contact encountered only light
screening forces, and intelligence sources reported that most enemy
units had withdrawn to refit. It became clear to Ridgway that a
primitive logistical system permitted enemy forces to undertake
offensive operations for no more than a week or two before they had
to pause for replacements and new supplies, a pattern he exploited
when he assigned his troops their next objective.
Whereas Ridgway was now certain his forces could achieve that
objective, General MacArthur was far less optimistic. Earlier, in
acknowledging the Chinese intervention, he had notified Washington
that the Chinese could drive the UNC out of Korea unless he received
major reinforcement. At the time, however, there was still only a
slim reserve of combat units in the United States. Four more
National Guard divisions were being brought into federal service to
build up the General Reserve, but not with commitment in Korea in
mind. The main concern in Washington was the possibility that the
Chinese entry into Korea was only one part of a USSR move toward
global war, a concern great enough to lead President Truman to
declare a state of national emergency on December 16. Washington
officials, in any event, considered Korea no place to become
involved in a major war. For all of these reasons, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff notified MacArthur that a major build-up of UNC forces was
out of the question. MacArthur was to stay in Korea if he could, but
should the Chinese drive UNC forces back on Pusan, the Joint Chiefs
would order a withdrawal to Japan.
Contrary to the reasoning in Washington, MacArthur meanwhile
proposed four retaliatory measures against the Chinese: blockade the
China coast, destroy China’s war industries through naval and air
attacks, reinforce the troops in Korea with Chinese Nationalist
forces, and allow diversionary operations by Nationalist troops
against the China mainland. These proposals for escalation received
serious study in Washington but were eventually discarded in favor
of sustaining the policy of confining the fighting to Korea.
Interchanges between Washington and Tokyo next centered on the
timing of a withdrawal from Korea. MacArthur believed Washington
should establish all the criteria of an evacuation, whereas
Washington wanted MacArthur first to provide the military guidelines
on timing. The whole issue was finally settled after General J.
Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, visited Korea, saw that the
Eighth Army was improving under Ridgway’s leadership, and became as
confident as Ridgway that the Chinese would be unable to drive the
Eighth Army off the peninsula. “As of now,” General Collins
announced on January 15, “we are going to stay and fight.”
Ten days later, Ridgway opened a cautious offensive, beginning
with attacks in the west and gradually widening them to the east.
The 8th Army advanced slowly and methodically, ridge by ridge, phase
line by phase line, wiping out each pocket of resistance before
moving farther north. Enemy forces fought back vigorously, and in
February struck back in the central region. During that
counterattack, the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division successfully
defended the town of Chipyong-ni against a much larger Chinese
force, a victory that to Ridgway symbolized the Eighth Army’s
complete recovery of its fighting spirit. After defeating the
enemy’s February effort, the 8th Army again advanced steadily,
recaptured Seoul by mid-March, and by the first day of spring stood
just below the 38th parallel.
During this time, intelligence agencies uncovered evidence of
rear area offensive preparations by the enemy. Evidence of this
continued to mount as troops advanced. As a precaution, Ridgway on
April 12 published a plan for orderly delaying actions to be fought
when and if the enemy attacked.
On March 20, the Joint Chiefs notified MacArthur that a
presidential announcement was being drafted that would indicate a
willingness to negotiate with the Chinese and North Koreans to make
“satisfactory arrangements for concluding the fighting,” and that
would be issued “before any advance with major forces north of 38th
Parallel.” Before the president’s announcement could be made,
however, MacArthur issued his own offer to enemy commanders to
discuss an end to the fighting, but it was an offer that sounded
like an ultimatum.
President Truman had in mind to relieve MacArthur but had yet to
make a final decision when the next incident occurred. On April 5,
Joseph W. Martin, Republican leader in the House of Representatives,
rose and read MacArthur’s response to a request for comment on an
address Martin had made suggesting the use of Nationalist Chinese
forces to open a second front. In that response, MacArthur said he
believed in “meeting force with maximum counter-force,” and that the
use of Nationalist Chinese forces fitted that belief. Convinced,
also, that “... if we lose this war to communism in Asia, the fall
of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid
war ...,” he added that there could be “ ...no substitute for
victory ...” in Korea.
President Truman could not accept MacArthur’s open disagreement
with and challenge of national policy. There were also grounds for a
charge of insubordination, since MacArthur had not cleared the offer
to enemy commanders to discuss an end to the fighting or his
response to Representative Martin with Washington. His actions were
contrary to a Presidential directive issued in December requiring
prior clearance of all releases touching on national policy.
Concluding MacArthur was “...unable to give his wholehearted support
to the policies of the United States government and of the United
Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties,” President
Truman recalled MacArthur on April 11 and named General Ridgway as
successor. MacArthur returned to the United States to receive the
plaudits of a nation shocked by the relief of one of its greatest
military heroes. Before the Congress and the public, he defended his
own views against those of the Truman Administration. The
controversy continued for many months.
Meanwhile, twenty-one Chinese and nine North Korean divisions
launched strong attacks in western Korea and lighter attacks in the
east, with the major effort aimed at Seoul. General Van Fleet
withdrew through successive delaying positions to previously
established defenses a few miles north of Seoul where he finally
contained the enemy advance. When enemy forces withdrew to
refurbish, Van Fleet laid plans for, then postponed a countermove
when his intelligence sources indicated he had stopped only the
first effort of the enemy offensive.
Enemy forces renewed their attack after darkness on May 15.
Whereas Van Fleet had expected the major assault again to be
directed against Seoul, enemy forces this time drove hardest in the
east central region. Adjusting units to place more troops in the
path of the enemy advance and laying down tremendous amounts of
artillery fire, Van Fleet halted the attack by May 20 after the
enemy had penetrated thirty miles. Determined to prevent the enemy
from assembling strength for another attack, he immediately ordered
the Eighth Army forward. The Chinese and North Koreans, disorganized
after their own attacks, resisted only where their supply
installations were threatened. Elsewhere, the 8th Army advanced with
almost surprising ease.
Washington decided to wait for a bid for armistice negotiations
from the Chinese and North Koreans, to whom it should be clear by
this time that their committed forces lacked the ability to conquer
South Korea. In line with this decision, Van Fleet began to fortify
his positions. Enemy forces used the respite from attack to recoup
heavy losses and to develop defenses opposite the Eighth Army. The
fighting lapsed into patrolling and small local clashes.
On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, the USSR delegate to the United
Nations, announced in New York during a broadcast of the UN radio
program, “The Price of Peace,” that the USSR believed the war in
Korea could be settled. When Communist China endorsed Malik’s
proposal over the radio, President Truman authorized General Ridgway
to arrange armistice talks with his enemy counterpart. Through an
exchange of radio messages, both sides agreed to open negotiations
on July 10 at the town of Kaesong, in territory which was then
no-man’s-land in the west but which would become a neutral area.
At the first armistice conference, the two delegations agreed
hostilities would continue until an armistice agreement was signed.
Except for brief, violent episodes, however, action along the front
would never regain the momentum of the first year. By July 26, the
two armistice delegations fixed the points to be settled in order to
achieve an armistice. But then the enemy delegates began to delay
negotiations, to gain time, it seemed, in which to strengthen their
military forces, and thus also to strengthen their bargaining
position. In any case, the enemy delegation continued to delay and
finally broke off negotiations on August 22.
General Van Fleet, at that juncture, opened limited-objective
attacks, which were won by the last week of October.
These successes may have had an influence on the enemy, who
agreed to return to the armistice conference table. Negotiations
resumed on October 25. Hope for an early armistice grew on November
27 when the two delegations agreed a line of demarcation during an
armistice would be the existing line of contact, provided an
armistice agreement was reached within thirty days. Hence, while
both sides awaited the outcome of negotiations, fighting during the
remainder of 1951 tapered off to patrol clashes, raids, and small
battles for possession of outposts in no-man’s-land. The first
tactical use of helicopters by U.S. forces occurred about this time
when almost a thousand marines were lifted to a front-line position
and a like number returned to the rear.
Discord over several issues, including the exchange of prisoners
of war, prevented an armistice agreement within the stipulated
thirty days. The prisoner-of-war quarrel heightened in January 1952,
after UNC delegates proposed to give captives a choice in
repatriation proceedings, maintaining that those prisoners who did
not wish to return to their homelands could be simply “set at
liberty” according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The enemy
representatives protested vigorously. While argument continued, both
sides tacitly extended the November 27 provisions for a line of
demarcation. This had the effect of holding battle action to the
pattern of the thirty-day waiting period. By May 1952, the two
delegations were completely deadlocked on the repatriation issue.
On May 7, inmates of UNC Prison Camp No. 1 on Koje-do, an
island of the southern coast, on orders smuggled to them from North
Korea, managed to entice the U.S. camp commander to a compound gate,
drag him inside, and keep him captive. The strategy, which became
clear in subsequent prisoner demands, was to trade the U.S.
officer’s life and release for UNC admissions of inhumane treatment
of captives, including alleged cruelties during previous screenings
of prisoners in which a large number of prisoners refused
repatriation. The obvious objective was to discredit the voluntary
repatriation stand taken by the UNC delegation. Although a new camp
commander obtained his predecessor’s release, in the process he
signed a damaging statement including an admission that “...there
have been instances of bloodshed where many prisoners of war have
been killed and wounded by UN Forces.”
Amid the Koje-do trouble, General Ridgway received transfer
orders placing him in command of NATO forces in Europe. General Mark
W. Clark became the new commander in the Far East, with one less
responsibility than MacArthur and Ridgway had carried. On April 28,
a peace treaty with Japan had gone into effect, restoring Japan’s
sovereignty and thus ending the occupation. Faced immediately with
the Koje-do affair, General Clark had the impression of walking “...
into something that felt remarkably like a swinging door....” He
immediately repudiated the prison camp commander’s statement. Moving
swiftly, he placed Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner in charge of the
camp with instructions to move the prisoners into smaller, more
manageable compounds and to institute other measures that would
eliminate the likelihood of another uprising. General Boatner
completed the task on June 10.
While argument over repatriation continued, action at the front
continued as a series of artillery duels, patrols, ambushes, raids,
and bitter contests for outpost positions. But for all the furious
and costly small-scale battles that took place, the lines remained
substantially unchanged at the end of 1952. The armistice conference
meanwhile went into an indefinite recess in October with the
repatriation issue still unresolved.
In November, the American people elected Republican Dwight D.
Eisenhower as their new president. An issue in the campaign had been
the war in Korea, over which there was a growing popular discontent,
in particular with the lack of progress toward an armistice. In a
campaign pledge to “go to Korea,” Eisenhower implied that if elected
he would attempt to end the war quickly. Consequently, when the
president-elect in early December fulfilled his promise to visit
Korea, there was indeed some expectation of a dramatic change in the
conduct of the war. General Clark went so far as to prepare detailed
estimates of measures necessary to obtain a military victory. But it
quickly became clear that Eisenhower, like President Truman,
preferred to seek an honorable armistice.
In the hope of prompting a resumption of armistice negotiations,
General Clark in February 1953 proposed to his enemy counterpart
that the two sides exchange sick and wounded prisoners. The break
finally came near the end of March, about three weeks after the
death of Josef Stalin, when enemy armistice delegates not only
replied favorably to General Clark’s proposal that sick and wounded
captives be exchanged but also suggested that this exchange perhaps
could “... lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of
prisoners of war.” With that, the armistice conference resumed in
April. An exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was carried out
that same month; and before the middle of June, the prisoner
repatriation problem was settled through agreement that each side
would have an opportunity to persuade those captives refusing return
to their homelands to change their minds.
The pace of battle quickened in May when Chinese forces launched
regimental attacks against outposts guarding approaches to the
Eighth Army’s main line in the west. A large battle flared on June
10 when three Chinese divisions penetrated two miles through a South
Korean position in central Korea before being contained. That
engagement could have been the last of the war since the terms of an
armistice by then were all but complete. But on June 18, ROK
President Rhee, who from the beginning had objected to any armistice
that left Korea divided, ordered the release of North Korean
prisoners who had refused repatriation. Within a few days most of
these North Korean captives “broke out” of prison camp and
disappeared among a cooperative South Korean populace. Since the
captives had been guarded by South Korean troops, UNC officials
disclaimed responsibility for the break, but the enemy armistice
delegates denounced the action as a serious breach of faith. It took
more than a month to repair the damage done by Rhee’s order.
Enemy forces used this delay to wrest more ground from UNC
control. Units were deployed and a counterattack launched. The
attack force was halted on July 20 short of the original line, since
by that date the armistice delegations had come to a new accord and
needed only to work out a few small details. This ended the last
major battle of the war.
After a week of dealing with administrative matters, each chief
delegate signed the military armistice agreement at Panmunjom at
10:00 a.m. on July 27. General Clark and the enemy commanders later
affixed their signatures at their respective headquarters. As
stipulated in the agreement, all fighting stopped 12 hours after the
first signing, at 10:00 p.m., July 27, 1953. When the final casualty
report for the 37 months of fighting was prepared, total UNC
casualties reached over 550,000, including almost 95,000 dead. U.S.
losses numbered 142,091, of whom 33,629 were killed, 103,284
wounded, and 5,178 missing or captured. U.S. Army casualties alone
totaled 27,704 dead, 77,596 wounded, and 4,658 missing or captured.
The bulk of these casualties occurred during the first year of the
fighting. The estimate of enemy casualties, including prisoners,
exceeded 1,500,000, of which 900,000, almost two-thirds, were
Chinese.
By September 6, all prisoners wishing to be repatriated had been
exchanged. >From the UNC returnees came full details of brutally
harsh treatment in enemy prison camps and of an extensive communist
indoctrination program, of “brain-washing” techniques, designed to
produce prisoner collaboration. Several hundred U.S. returnees were
investigated on charges of collaborating with the enemy, but few
were convicted.
The transfer of nonrepatriates to the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission was undertaken next. In the drawn-out and
troublesome procedure that followed, few of the prisoners changed
their minds as officials from both sides attempted to convince
former members of their respective commands that they should return
home. Of twenty-three Americans who at first refused repatriation,
two decided to return. On February 1, 1954, the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission dissolved itself after releasing the last of
the nonrepatriates as civilians free to decide their own
destinations.
The main scene then shifted to Geneva, Switzerland, where the
political conference recommended in the armistice agreement convened
on April 26. There was a complete impasse from the beginning: the
representatives of UNC member nations wanted to reunify Korea
through elections supervised by the United Nations; the Communist
delegation refused to recognize the UN’s authority to deal with the
matter. The conference on Korea closed June 15, 1954, with the
country still divided and with opposing forces, although their guns
remained silent, still facing each other across the demilitarized
zone. The prognosis was that this situation would continue for some
time to come.
The Geneva impasse, leaving Korea divided essentially along the
prewar line, could scarcely be viewed as merely re-establishing the
land’s status quo antebellum. For by the end of the war, the ROK
Army had grown to a well-organized force of sixteen divisions and
was scheduled to raise four more divisions, a force North Korea’s
resources would be strained to match. Within days of the armistice,
moreover, South Korea had a mutual security pact with the United
States and a two-hundred-million-dollar first installment of
promised American economic aid.
The war’s impact reached far beyond Korea. Despite criticism of
the armistice by those who agreed with General MacArthur that there
was “no substitute for victory,” the UNC had upheld the UN principle
of suppressing armed aggression. True, the UN Security Council had
been able to enlist forces under the UN banner in June 1950 only in
the absence of the USSR veto. Nevertheless, the UNC success
strengthened the possibility of keeping or restoring peace through
the UN machinery.
More far-reaching was the war’s impact on the two great power
blocs. The primary result for the Western Bloc was a decided
strengthening of the NATO alliance. Virtually without military power
in June 1950, NATO could call on fifty divisions and strong air and
naval contingents by 1953, a build-up directly attributable to the
increased threat of general war seen in the outbreak of hostilities
in Korea. With further reinforcement in the NATO forecast at the end
of the Korean War, USSR armed aggression in western Europe became
unlikely. For the East, the major result was the emergence of
Communist China as a Great Power. A steady improvement in the
Chinese army and air force during the war gave China a more powerful
military posture at war’s end than when it had intervened; and its
performance in Korea, despite vast losses, won China respect as a
nation to be reckoned with not only in Asian but in world affairs.
Outside of these direct impacts of the war, the relative
positions of West and East also had been affected during the war
years by the development of thermonuclear devices. The United States
exploded its first such device in 1952, the USSR in August 1953. The
exact consequences of all these changes were incalculable. But it
was certain the Cold War would continue and that both power blocs
would face new challenges and new responses.
Every word ever written about this war tells the same story: it
was an ideological struggle between the Evil Empire of Communism and
the good old Capitalists. The two players are identified correctly,
but what was cleverly omitted by the spin doctors of the time was
that both sides shared a greater need in common — which was their
respective Industrial Military Complexes and the overarching Cold
War. Both the United States and the USSR were keen to demonstrate
their superior technology and not keen to do so directly as the
threat of nuclear war was too horrible to imagine — all assessments
led them away from this option. That’s not to say it was not
considered as the ebb and flow of the war frustrated the reptilian
minds of the militarist politicians of either side. The bloody
details of this idiotic war show clearly there was to be no winner.
At this point, in order to properly identify the competing
interests, it is necessary to carry out the following process. On
the one hand we have the Marxist Communists — they are readily
identified. On the same side we have the Western Marxists — the
socialists. Opposing this philosophical coalition are the
capitalists of the West. The great problem for the West was always
that their side was divided philosophically, politically and
ideologically between true capitalists who worshipped power and
greed and socialists who longed for a utopian society. In the middle
we see, as usual, the innocent and ignorant citizens of both sides —
the cannon fodder. The competing factions saw this war as the ideal
opportunity to demonstrate their superior might — too bad the
military leaders were not informed.
To add clarification to the dichotomy of the opposing forces —
the Marxist-inspired on the one hand and the capitalists on the
other— Dennis H. Wrong, in his book The Problem of Order,
posits the following:
Marx is usually seen as the quintessential
theorist of social conflict. Certainly, class conflict stands at the
very center of his conception of class-divided societies and is
identified as the motor of the historical process in which different
types of societies succeed one another. The socialist revolution,
however, will constitute the last of such successions, for it will
usher in a new communist society that will be classless and
therefore conflict-free. Conflict, in short, occurs only in the
period that Marx called pre-history; when history proper begins with
the overthrow of bourgeois society, universal consensus will be
achieved. Communist society will transcend both the egoism/altruism
and the conflict/consensus oppositions since it will abolish the
conditions of scarcity and class conflict in which they are rooted.
(page 210)
If we take Wrong's position as having merit, then it becomes
easier to identify these opposing forces. What the innocents of the
West failed to recognize was that their side was not only fighting
communism but also the ever-spreading virus of socialism throughout
society. The enemy had simply penetrated western society and was
destroying it from the inside out. This is classic Fabianism, which
found a home with the weak-minded of the late nineteenth century and
the similarly weak-minded of the middle of the century. Not only had
communism spread throughout Europe and Asia, but its camouflaged
western version — socialism — had taken root in western society and
was now allied with communism. This, then, explains why the
political process of Western governments were not fully committed to
victory in this or succeeding regional wars. The Korean War was
simply a test of strength between communism/socialism and
capitalism.
The obvious and inevitable result was an ignominious retreat by
the Western allies leading to a negotiated peace agreement. The
Industrial Military Complexes and those who run them (the
multinationals in the West and the party officials in the
East) had been satisfied. Their reptilian natures had been
adequately satiated by the show of strength. Those missing in action
became mere pawns at the negotiating table — many would just be
forgotten by the political zealots, although not by their families
and loved ones. The excuse proffered by the treasonous politicians
was that they were merely war statistics. Thousands of MIAs were
shipped from North Korean prisoner-of-war camps to communist slave
camps in the USSR, never to be heard of again.
The question left unanswered during the intervening forty-odd
years since the cessation of the Korean War was this: Why did
President Truman, a self-confessed socialist, countermand General
MacArthur, relieve him of duty, and then carry on an unwinnable war?
From the point of MacArthur’s demise, the war was lost as the
resolve to achieve victory was not shared by Truman or his cohorts
in Washington. Why?
Ten years later, this farcical episode was repeated in Vietnam.
The Vietnam War was a carbon-copy of the Korean War. Only this time,
the Industrial Military Complexes on both sides had a new range of
military hardware to exert against each other.
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